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In this paper, a worker’s productivity is assumed to depend on his own quality and on the
average quality of other workers in the same country. The external effects associated with worker
quality give rise to increasing returns to average worker quality. As a result, free migration
generally reduces world output. Within each country, social benefits that induce low quality
workers to leave the labor force can increase national income. Moreover, the operation of such a
benefit scheme financed by a proportional income tax can increase everybody’s net-of-tax income.
The political economy of a system of transfers within a country is analyzed. In particular, the level
of transfers is assumed to be determined by popular vote. In this setting, small migration flows can
bring about large changes in transfer levels and in labor participation rates. The anticipation of
migration generally reduces the level of transfers to the unemployed.
*I am grateful to Robin Boadway and participants of the 1994 ISPE seminar at Vanderbilt
University for useful comments.1
1. Introduction
International migration has been an important phenomenon in modern times. The migration
of people from Europe to the United States, peaking between 1880 and 1910, has been of
gargantuan size. In the post-world war II period, the countries of Northern Europe have faced a
significant influx of people from Southern Europe and elsewhere. By 1982, the shares of foreigners
in the total population in Germany, France, and Switzerland were 7.6, 8.2 and 14.3 per cent,
respectively.
1 The shares of foreigners in employment for these countries were even larger. Lower
transportation costs and better information about conditions abroad may have contributed to a
higher international mobility of people. In recent years, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe
has provided an additional impetus to international migration to Western Europe.
Immigrants generally seek employment in the destination country or, if eligible, they
receive unemployment benefits or other income support. International migrants differ widely in
their age and education and thus in their ability to find employment. The private pay-off to
migration, therefore, depends importantly on the migrants’ personal characteristics. The economic
impact of immigration on the source and recipient countries likewise depends on who the migrants
are. Migration of the most productive workers represents the greatest loss to the source country and
at the sime time the greatest gain for the recipient country. Not surprisingly, many countries
restrict legal immigration only to people with sufficient work experience and education. In practice,
many international migrants, however, receive some income support in the destination country.
Migrants may also benefit from publicly provided education, housing and health care. As a result,
immigration threatens to put considerable strain on the social security systems in some Western
European countries. These pressures may ultimately lead to a partial dismantling of the social
welfare state in these countries. As a result, international migration has become an important
political issue.
This paper presents a model of international migration that recognizes that workers are of
heterogeneous quality.
2 The model assumes that a worker’s productivity in a country depends2
positively on the average quality of co-workers in the same country. In this setting, international
migration affects the productivity of non-immigrant workers in the source and the recipient
countries, if it changes the average quality of workers in these countries. The model displays what
can be called increasing returns to average quality, as a country’s aggregate output increases more
than linearly with average worker quality.
The paper first considers international migration in the absence of any policy intervention.
If two countries have different average worker qualities, then all workers in the country with low
average worker quality wish to migrate to the other country. The migration incentive ceases to
exist, once both countries have equal average worker qualities. This leveling effect following
international migration reduces aggregate world output as a result of the increasing returns to
average worker quality. The reduction in average worker quality in the immigration country
following free migration provides a rationale for restricting immigration to high quality foreign
workers.
In the present model, national output can be increased by retiring low quality workers from
the labor market by offering them sufficiently high unemployment benefits. Similarly, Sala-i-
Martin (1992) shows that the retirement of older, less productive workers can increase aggregate
output. The benefits to unemployed workers are assumed to be financed by a proportional income
tax on all incomes. Interestingly, transfer payments to the unemployed generally can increase all
agents’ net-of-tax incomes. At higher benefit levels, however, there is the expected trade off
between the net incomes of the employed and the unemployed. Previous studies of income
redistribution with migration (see Brown and Oates (1987), Epple and Romer (1991), Crane
(1992), Persson and Tabellini (1992), and Wildasin (1991)) or without migration (see Meltzer and
Richards (1981)) have ignored the output enhancing potential of income transfers. The present
analysis also differs from Meltzer and Richards (1981), Epple and Romer (1991) and Persson and
Tabellini (1992) in that income tranfers only go to the unemployed. As result, there is no conflict
of interest among the working population. Following earlier contributions, we assume that the3
transfer level is determined by popular vote. The median voter possibly favors a positive transfer
even if he himself is employed, as redistribution can yield sufficiently large efficiency gains to
offset the income taxes necessary to finance the income transfers.
Interestingly, the median voter potentially is indifferent between working with low benefits,
or not working with high benefits. Such a knife-edge indifference between two distinctly different
transfer levels evolves into a strict preference for one of the two following a small inflow of
immigrants. In this instance, small migration inflows can have large implications for the system of
unemployment benefits. A discrete change in benefit levels and income tax rates generally has non-
negligible implications for agents’ welfare, even if the median voter’s net income changes very
little with the discrete break in the benefit system. Corresponding to a discrete change in unem-
ployment benefits, the rate of labor participation also changes significantly.
The paper finally considers how the benefit system is affected by an anticipation of
potential immigration flows of benefit recipients, following Brown and Oates (1987), Epple and
Romer (1991), and Wildasin (1991). Specifically, the implications for the transfer level, the income
tax rate, the labor participation rate and the distribution of income are considered. A prospected
influx of foreign benefit recipients following higher benefit levels generally leads to a lower
benefit level. The income distributional effects and also the total output effect depend on whether
the median voter is employed or unemployed. In the former case, lower benefits generally reduce
all agents’ net incomes and thus also aggregate income. In the latter case, lower benefits imply that
income is redistributed from the unemployed to the employed, while aggregate income increases.
The result that higher factor mobility reduces the scope for taxation for purposes of income
redistribution is also obtained in Persson and Tabellini (1992) who focus on the implications of
higher capital mobility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model of
international migration in the absence of income transfers. Section 3 introduces income transfers
for an economy without migration. Section 4 focuses on the political economy of income transfers4
in such an economy. Section 5 examines how (exogenous) migration flows affect the politicallly
determined transfer system. Section 6 considers the adjustment of the tranfer system in anticipation
of international migration movitated by differences in income transfers. Section 7 concludes.
2. Migration without transfers
The world consists of two countries: home and foreign, with stars denoting foreign
variables. In each country, there is a population of workers that are heterogeneous in their quality,
which can be in part innate and in part the result of education. Let a denote the quality of a
domestic worker. The variable a is distributed on the interval with density f(a), and [a, a]
distribution function F(a). The size of the domestic population is denoted S so that Let S F(a).
µ be the mean domestic worker quality. The quality distribution and total size of a country’s
population can be altered through migration. A worker’s productivity is assumed to be positively
related to his own quality, a, and to the mean quality of other workers in the same country, µ,o n
account of peer group effects in the work force.
3 Peer group effects may arise as lowly skilled
workers learn from highly skilled workers, or they may be purely psychological. Henderson,
Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978) and Arnott and Rowse (1987) have demonstrated that peer
group effects are important in educational settings. Let us assume, specifically, that a worker’s









Equation (1) indicates that national income, Y, is quadratic in average worker quality, µ,
while it linear in work force size, S. The model thus displays what can be called increasing returns5
to average worker quality, while there are only constant returns to scale.
The two countries generally differ in their distributions of worker quality. In particular, let
us assume that domestic workers on average are of higher quality than foreign workers, i.e. µ>µ
* .
In this instance, all the world’s workers potentially have a higher individual productivity in the
home country than in the foreign country. Consequently, all foreign workers have an incentive to
migrate to the home country if migration is costless. Migration generally affects the productivities
of the migrants as well as of non-migrants. Let us consider that foreign workers of quality a
*
migrate to the home country. Let Ym
* denote the income of these foreign migrants, while Y-m and Y-
m
* are the incomes of domestic and foreign non-migrants. An increase in the range of foreign
migrants starting from a quality level a
* affects the income variables Ym
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Equation (2) confirms that foreign workers of any quality can increase their private
incomes by migrating to the home country if µ>µ
* . Equation (3) indicates that immigration raises
home income levels, if immigrant workers are of higher average quality than the average original
home country worker, i.e. if a
* >µ , and vice versa. Similarly, emigration lowers foreign incomes
of those staying behind, if the average quality of emigrant workers exceeds the average quality of
original foreign workers, i.e. if a
* >µ
*, and vice versa.
4
Worldwide income, denoted Yw, is the sum of the individual incomes of migrants and of6
non-migrants in the two countries. Formally, this means that Yw =Y m
*+Y -m +Y -m
*. Adding (2)-(4),
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From (5), we see that migration increases world output if a
* >( µ+µ
*)/2, and vice versa.
The effects of migration on the incomes of non-migrants suggests that countries have
strong incentives to regulate international migration. Equation (3), specifically, suggests that the
home country optimally admits only foreign workers of quality a
* exceeding the average domestic
worker quality, µ, if it only cares about its original inhabitants.
5 Countries, indeed, typically favor
the immigration of individuals with high level skills and education. The United States, for instance,
grants H-1 work permits to highly trained foreigners for whom no counterparts are available in the
U.S. labor market. The authorities of the foreign emigration country may care about the incomes of
their non-migrant population or, alternatively, about the incomes of their entire original population.
In the first case, the foreign authorities optimally allow only citizens of quality a
* less than µ
* to
emigrate from (4). In the latter case, the foreign country allows the emigration of relatively low
quality workers with a
* less than µ
*2/(2µ
* -µ )if 2µ
* >µfrom (4) and (5), while no emigration
restriction is called for if 2µ
* < µ. For this second foreign country objective, emigration policy is
clearly less restrictive. Note that we always have that µ
*2/(2µ
* -µ )exceeds µ, which implies that
there originally is a non-negligible quality range of workers that both countries will allow to
migrate. As agents within this range are migrating from the foreign to the home country, one of
the two countries’ migration restrictions will become binding. In principle, either the foreign
emigration or the domestic immigration restriction can be binding first.
To conclude this section, let us consider the implications of completely free international
migration. The incentive to migrate ceases to exist once the average worker qualities in the two
countries are equal, i.e. µ=µ
* .
6It is evident that free migration increases (decreases) the incomes7
of all original foreign (home) country workers. Interestingly, world income unambigously declines.
To see this, let µ0 (µ0
*) and S0 (S0
*) be the pre-migration home (foreign) country average worker










Relative post-migration income, q, in (6) is less than unity if µ ¹ µ
*. This result is a direct
implication of the increasing returns to average quality evident in equation (1). The existence of
increasing returns to average quality suggests that workers optimally are stratified by their quality
if the objective is to maximize world output.
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3. The introduction of transfers
The present model implies that a worker’s productivity increases, if other workers of below
average quality leave the labor force. Such exits from the labor force may lead to higher total
output, if the quality of exiting workers is sufficiently below the average. Exits from the labor
market, however, are never privately advantageous, unless the exiters are provided with an
alternative source of income. This section considers income transfer schemes with the aim of
retiring low quality workers from the labor force for a country with a fixed population. Let us
assume, in particular, that non-active individuals receive a pre-tax unemployment benefit, b.T o
finance these benefits, the authorities impose an income tax at a rate t on all income including
unemployment benefits. At a given benefit level, b, individuals below a certain critical quality level
(if any) leave the work force. The quality level ac of the marginal worker indifferent between
working and receiving unemployment benefits is given by,8
ac = b/µ (7)
A higher benefit level, b, implies a higher critical quality level, ac. With individuals of






Government budget balance requires that the unemployment benefit outlays are equal to
the income tax receipts as follows,
b F(ac)=t[b F(ac)+µ
2(S - F(ac)] (9)
Not surprisingly, a higher benefit level, b, implies a higher income tax rate, t. Next, let us
consider how a change in the critical quality level ac (and correspondingly changes in the benefit
level, b, and the income tax rate, t) affect aggregate income, Y. Differentiating Y in (8) with
respect to ac yields,
(10) dY
dac
(µ 2ac )µ f(ac)
National income, Y, is highest if ac = µ/2 from (10), provided that 2a < µ. Next, let us
consider how changes in the income transfer scheme affect the distribution of income. The net
incomes of employed and unemployed workers, denoted ne and nu, are given by aµ(1 - t) and b(1
- t), respectively. Note that a change in the income transfer scheme affects the net incomes of all
employed workers proportionately. After some manipulation, we see that changing the critical
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Equations (11) and (12) immediately imply that slightly increasing ac above a increases the
net incomes of active as well as non-active workers if 2a <µ ,a sF ( a )=0 . Introducing low level
unemployment benefits thus generally is Pareto improving. This result reflects that in the present
model an income transfer scheme can increase total income rather than merely redistribute income.
Equations (11) and (12) imply that the net income of the employed (unemployed), ne (nu), reaches
a maximum for a value of ac below (above) µ/2. Let the benefit levels that are consistent with
maximizing ne and nu be denoted be and bu, respectively. For benefit levels between be and bu there
exists the usual trade off between the net incomes of the two classes of workers. Not surprisingly,
the value of the benefit level, b, that maximizes Y lies in between be and bu.
4. Voting on transfers
In this section, we examine how the transfer system is determined by the political process.
In particular, we will assume that the benefit level, b, is determined by popular vote. To start, let
us examine the preferences of workers of varying quality over possible values of b. First note that
the electorate will never set the benefit level, b, either below be or above bu, as in these instances
all voters’ net incomes can be enhanced by either increasing and decreasing the benefit level,
respectively. In other words, voting will yield a value of b within the interval bounded by be and
bu. It is now useful to consider voter preferences over values of b within this range separately for
three categories of workers: (i) workers who are unemployed at a benefit level be, (ii) workers who
become unemployed for a value of b between be and bu, and (iii) workers who are employed at a
benefit level bu.10
Workers in category (i), who are already unemployed at the low benefit level be, see their
net incomes rise as b is raised from be to bu. These workers, therefore, will always vote for the
higher of two values of b within the interval between be and bu. Next, let us consider workers who
cease to be employed at a critical benefit level, denoted bc(a), between be and bu. The critical
benefit level, bc(a), clearly increases with the quality level a. The net incomes of individuals in this
group fall with the benefit level b between be and bc(a), while their net incomes rise with b for
values of b between bc(a) and bu. For these individuals, net income thus is lowest at a benefit level
bc(a), when the individual is indifferent between working and not working. At the same time, net
income is highest either at a benefit level be, for the relatively high quality workers, or at a level
bu, for the relatively low quality workers in this category. Finally, individuals in category (iii), who
are employed even at the high benefit level bu, see their net incomes fall as b rises from be to bu.
In summary, all individuals achieve the highest net income at a value of b equal to either be or bu.
In particular, workers of quality lower (higher) than a certain level obtain the highest net income at
a benefit level bu (be).
As is usual, the outcome of the vote will be determined by the median voter. The voting
outcome will be be, if at this benefit level the median voter obtains higher net income than at a
benefit level bu, and vice versa. In principle, the median voter can be in any of the three catgories
of agents. For example, the median voter can be in category (iii), in which case he will vote for a
positive level of unemployment benefits, be, even though he himself will be employed at this
benefit level. If the median voter is in category (ii), then it is possible that he in fact obtains equal
net incomes at benefit levels be and bu. The median voter, specifically, can be indifferent between
working at a benefit level be and not working at a benefit level bu. In this instance, the benefit
levels be and bu are both possible voting outcomes. Note that in this instance only the median voter
is indifferent between benefit levels be and bu. Workers of higher (lower) quality than the median
voter will strictly prefer the benefit level be (bu).11
5. The effect of immigration on transfers
In this section, we consider the impact of immigration on the income transfer scheme. This
immigration is assumed to be independent of the income transfer system. Some international
migration, indeed, may be motivated by, for example, a flight from oppression rather than by
differences in international net income levels. Let us assume that immigrants have the same rights
and duties as original residents. In particular, they are eligible for unemployment benefits and they
are required to pay income taxes.
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As an aside, it is first interesting to consider that the benefit level is set by a government
interested in maximizing aggregate income, Y, rather than the outcome of voting by self-interested
voters. In this instance, we know from (7) and (10) that ac = µ/2 and thus b=µ
2 /2. Let us assume
that foreign workers with quality level a
* migrate to the home country. If a
* is less than ac, then
the immigrant workers will be unemployed in the home country, and vice versa. If the immigrants
do not work, then the optimal transfer level, b, the critical quality level, ac, and also output, Y, are
not affected by the immigration. To finance additional transfers, however, the income tax rate, t,
has to rise. As a result, the net-of-tax incomes of all original home residents fall. If the immi-
grants’ quality, a
*, exceeds ac, then the immigrant workers will be employed in the home country.
Unlike in section 2, immigrant workers now pay income taxes. The effect of immigration on the
income of original home residents in (3), therefore, has to be replaced by,
(13) dY m
da
(a µ ta )µf (a )
From (13), we see that immigrants of quality a
* exceeding µ/(1 + t) increase the aggregate
income of original home residents. As before, not all potential immigrant workers who can find
employment in the home country increase Y-m. In particular, immigrants of quality a
* between µ/2
and µ/(1 + t) will work in the home country, but from (13) we see that they reduce the aggregate
income of original home residents. The immigration of foreign workers of quality a
* exceeding ac12
generally leads to a change in the income transfer scheme that maximizes aggregate income, Y.
Such immigration, in particular, leads to a higher (lower) benefit level and and lower (higher) labor
participation rate of the original population, if a
* is more (less) than µ.
Now let us consider how the income transfer system is affected by immigration when the
benefit level is determined by popular vote. At the same time, we consider whether immigration
will in fact be favored by the median voter. At a given pre-immigration benefit level, there
generally are three separate channels by which immigration affects the net incomes of original
home country workers. First, if the immigrants become benefit recipients, then the income tax rate
has to rise to finance these additional benefit payments. Second, if the immigrants accept employ-
ment in the home country, then they can affect the productivities of existing employees by their
impact on mean worker quality. Third, a higher employment generally changes total income and
thus the income tax rate consistent with financing the existing transfer system. Generally,
immigration also leads to an adjustment in the benefit level selected by the median voter. This
benefit level adjustment, however, only has a second order effect on the median voter’s net
income. We can, therefore, ignore the adjustment in the benefit level, if we wish to assess whether
the median voter favors immigration.
To start, let us consider the immigration of workers of quality a
* less than ac. At the pre-
migration benefit level, these individuals will receive benefits in the home country. The type of
immigration clearly does not affect the productivities of employed workers. To pay for the
additional income transfers, the income tax rate, however, has to increase. Consequently, the
immigration of prospective benefit recipients reduces the net incomes of all original home country
residents. Such immigration, therefore, will be opposed by the median voter.
Next, let us consider the immigration of foreign workers of quality a
* exceeding ac.A tt h e
original benefit level, these individuals choose to work in the home country. The immigrants
increase (decrease) the productivity of already employed workers if a
* exceeds (is less than) µ.
9 At
the same time, total output increase (decreases) and, consequently, the income tax rate falls (rises)13
if a
* exceeds (is less than) µ/2.
10 If the median voter is unemployed, then ac > µ/2 from (12). The
income tax rate thus falls, and the median voter will favor the immigration. If instead the median
voter is employed, however, then ac < µ/2 from (11). The entry of prospective employees of
quality a
*, with a
* >µbenefits an employed median voter, as it (i) increases pre-tax income, and
(ii) reduces the income tax rate. The entry of workers with ac <a
*< µ/2, to the contrary, harms
an employed median voter, as it (i) reduces pre-tax income, and increases the income tax rate. For
a borderline quality level a
*, between µ/2 and µ, the median voter’s net income will not be
affected, as the reductions in the pre-tax income level and in the tax rate are exactly offsetting. An
employed median voter only favors the immigration of future employees of a quality exceeding
this borderline quality level.
In the previous section, we saw that the median voter possibly is indifferent between
working at a benefit level, be, and not working at a benefit level, bu. Small migration flows
potentially eliminate this indifference, and lead the median voter to strictly prefer one benefit level
to the other. To see this, let us consider the immigration of low quality foreign workers who will
be unemployed in the home country regardless of whether the median voter is employed or
unemployed. The immigration of such foreigners leads to higher total benefit payments at either
benefit level be or bu. Note that at a benefit level bu, the increase in total benefit payments relative
to aggregate income, Y, is relatively large. This is true because at bu the benefit level is large
relative to the entire income tax base. It can be seen that at bu the immigration of potential benefit
recipients leads to a relatively large reduction in the net income of the median voter. This assertion
is proven in the Appendix. The immigration of potential benefit recipients, therefore, leads the
median voter to strictly prefer the benefit level be, at which the median voter works. Conversely,
the emigration of benefit recipients leads the median voter to prefer the benefit level bu. Migration
flows that lead the median voter to prefer be to bu, and vice versa, lead to continuous changes in
the net income of the median voter. As already noted, the net incomes of other voters change
discretely. In particular, the net incomes of people of lower (higher) quality than the median voter14
jump up (down) when the median voter switches preference from a benefit level be to a benefit
level bu.
To conclude this section, let us consider which foreign workers in fact have the incentive
to emigrate to the home country, if only the home country operates an income transfer system. All
foreigners have an incentive to emigrate if µ(1 - t)>µ
* . In this instance, foreign workers of any
quality will achieve higher net incomes at home after emigrating, regardless of whether they will
work in the home country. If instead µ(1 - t)<µ
* , then only foreigners with a
* < b(1 - t)/µ
* (if
any) benefit from emigration. In this instance, all immigrants into the home country will be
unemployed.
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6. Transfer policy in antipication of migration
So far, we have considered how the income transfer system is adjusted in response to
exogenous migration flows. In this section, we recognize that the income transfer system itself
influences migration flows. In particular, we consider how the anticipation of potential migration
flows influences the determination of the income transfer system. To this end, let us assume that
the world consists of two symmetric countries that both operate an income transfer scheme.
Following Brown and Oates (1987), we will assume that only the poor, i.e. those who choose not
to work in their own country, are internationally mobile.
12 Their migration is motivated by the
difference in the net transfer level, denoted n, given by nu - nu
*. Let us assume that the unemployed
are heterogeneous in their moving costs. As a result, a share s(n) of the foreign unemployed will
migrate to the home country, if n>0 , and vice versa. We will assume s(0) = 0, with ds/dn > 0.I f
n>0 , then the aggregate income of home residents is less than home output by the expense of
providing foreign immigrants with income transfers. In particular, with n>0the aggregate income
accruing to original home residents, Y-m, is given by,
Y-m = Y - s(n) nu F(ac
*) (14)15
In (14), F(ac
*) is the volume of foreign unemployed, while Y is domestic output as in (8).
The exact impact of potential immigration on the income transfer system depends on how
the benefit level is determined. Generally, however, an additional cost of increasing benefit levels
with migration will be larger income transfers to foreign benefit recipients. This cost of higher
benefits ultimately reduces the benefit level compared to the case of no immigration considered in
sections (2) and (3). To illustrate this, let us consider the benchmark case where the benefit level is
set so as to maximize the aggregate income to original home residents in (14). With n>0 ,a n










An optimum requires that dY-m/dac in (15) is zero. We now wish to show that such an
optimum requires dn/dac >0in (15) starting from nu =n u
* . To see this, note that without
migration we have dnu/dac >0in (11) for ac < µ/2. With migration, the relationship between n and
ac further reflects the following two effects: (i) immigration into the home country, which increases
the number of domestic unemployed, leads to a higher domestic tax rate t, which reduces the net
benefit level nu, (ii) emigration from the foreign country reduces the number of foreign unemploy-
ed, and thus leads to a lower foreign income tax rate t
*, increasing nu
* (for a given foreign benefit
level b
*). Both of these effects tend to reduce the size of dn/dac. For there to be any migration
following an increase in b, however, we need to have dn/dac >0 . It now follows from (15) that
optimally dY/dac >0 . The prospect of immigration of foreign unemployed, thus, has reduced the
optimal domestic benefit level, b, and in this instance also national output, Y. If the reduction in
the domestic benefit level is slight, the net income levels of the (un)employed are higher (lower)
than in a world without migration.
The prospect of migration similarly leads to lower benefit levels if the benefit level is
determined by popular vote. In particular, the benefit level will be reduced below be or below bu,16
depending on whether the median voter is employed or unemployed. If the reduction in benefit
levels is slight, then in the first instance the net incomes of all original domestic residents decline,
relative to the no migration case. In this instance, the median voter clearly oppposes migration. In
the second instance, the net income levels of the employed and unemployed will increase and
decrease, respectively. The unemployed median voter will correspondingly disfavor free migration.
Several authors, including Oates (1968), Musgrave (1969), and Brown and Oates (1987),
have argued that income redistribution is best carried out by the highest level of government in a
federal system because of the potential mobility of benefit recipients among the lower level
jurisdictions. In the present model, a redistributive scheme at an international level is not
ambiguously better than independent national schemes, as the mobility of welfare recipients can in
fact increase the net income of employed individuals if the median voter is unemployed. Note,
however, that in the present model the median voter always loses from the potential mobility of the
unemployed. The median voter, therefore, will unambiguously be in favor of transfering the power
to operate an unemployment compensation scheme to an international authority.
7. Conclusion
This paper starts from the assumption that a worker’s productivity depends on his own
quality as well as on the quality of other workers around him. In this setting, migration immedia-
tely affects the productivities of workers left behind in the source country and of workers in the
recipient country. The model displays what can be called increasing returns to average quality: the
output of a group of workers increases more than linearly with average worker quality. The
migration of particular workers may or may not increase world output. Free international
migration, however, generally reduces world output. In this paper, the model has been applied to
migration between countries. The model, however, is also applicable to transfers of individuals
between institutions such as companies, universities, or even sports teams.
A main feature of the model is that a system of internal transfers to low quality workers so17
as to remove them from the labor force can increase total output. More strongly, retiring low
quality workers from the labor force potentially increases the net incomes of benefit recipients and
non-recipients alike. The model thus rationalizes the wide-spread systems of income transfers in
the developed countries on efficiency grounds. The fact that migration has important externalities
also implies that countries generally wish to restrict the exit and entry of workers. Most countries
in the world, indeed, have restrictive immigration policies.
Transfer systems generally have the dual role of effecting efficient exists from the labor
market and of redistributing income. The political process generally will take both aspects of
transfer systems into account. The distribution of the voting population determines whether the
transfer system only benefits the unemployed, at the expense of the employed, or whether in fact it
benefits both classes of workers. Interestingly, small changes in the composition of the population
can have large effects on the outcome of the voting process. In particular, small immigration of
benefit recipients can lead the median voter to prefer a materially different transfer system with
lower benefit and income tax levels. Such a discrete change in the benefit level leads to upward or
downward jumps in the net income levels of all but the median voter.18
Appendix
This appendix provides a proof of the assertion that immigration of foreign benefit
recipients leads the home country’s median voter to prefer a benefit level be to a level bu if before
he was indifferent. To see this, note that the net income levels ne and nu can be written as aµ(1 -
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This inequality reflects that the benefit level bu is relatively large compared to the entire
income tax base.19
References
Arnott, Richard and John Rowse, 1987, Peer Group Effects and Educational Attainment, Journal of
Public Economics 32, 287-305.
Berglas, Eitan and David Pines, 1981, Clubs, Local Public Goods and Transportation Models, a
Synthesis, Journal of Public Economics 15, 141-162.
Blank, Rebecca M., 1988, The Effect of Welfare and Wage Levels on the Location Decisions of
Female-Headed Households, Journal of Urban Economics 24, 186-211.
Brown, Charles C. and Wallace E. Oates, 1987, Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System,
Journal of Public Economics 32, 307-30.
Crane, Randall, 1992, Voluntary Income Redistribution with Migration, Journal of Urban
Economics 31, 84-98.
Djajic ’, Slobodan, 1986, International Migration, Remittances and Welfare in a Dependent
Economy, Journal of Development Economics 21, 229-234.
Epple, Dennis and Thomas Romer, 1991, Mobility and Redistribution, Journal of Political Econo-
my 99, 828-858.
Ethier, Wilfred J., 1986, Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem, American Economic
Review 76, 56-71.
Henderson, Vernon, Peter Mieszkowski and Yvon Sauvageau, 1978, Peer Group Effects and
Educational Attainment, Journal of Public Economics 10. 97-106.
Huizinga, Harry, 1994, Labor Market Stratification in the Presence of Peer Group Effects in the
Work Force, mimeo, Tilburg University.
Ladd, Helen F. and Fred C. Doolittle, 1982, Which Level of Government Should Assist the
Poor?, National Tax Journal 35, 323-36.
Oates, Wallace E., 1968, The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal System, Canadian Journal of
Economics 1, 37-54.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 1992, The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European
Integration, Review of Economic Studies 59, 689-701.
Meltzer, 1981, Allan H. and Scott F. Richards, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,
Journal of Political Economy 89, 814-27.
Musgrave, Richard A., 1969, Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Public Finance / Finances Publiques
24, 521-32.
Razin, Assaf and Efraim Sadka, 1992, International Migration and International Trade, NBER WP
No. 4230.
Rivera-Batiz, F., 1982, International Migration, Non-traded Goods and Economic Welfare in the20
Source Country, Journal of Development Economics 11, 81-90.
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992, Transfers, NBER WP No. 4186.
Wildasin, David E., 1991, Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market, American
Economic Review 81, 757-774.
Endnotes
1. See Razin and Sadka (1992), Table 9.
2. Ethier (1986) has previously distinguished between low skill and high skill labor in a
model of migration.
3. The mean by definition attaches equal weights to the qualities of all workers. One can,
however, easily think of activities where the productivities of a group’s members depend
chiefly on the group’s most able members or rather on its least able members. An army’s
overall success, for instance, may depend primarily on the brilliance of its general. The
productivity of a group of workers along a conveyor belt in a car assembly plant, on the
other hand, may be determined by the slowest worker.
4. Rivera-Batiz (1982) has previously shown that emigration lowers the welfare of non-
migrants if the average amount of capital owned and removed from the country by the
migrants differs from the aggregate capital-labor ratio. In addition, the welfare of non-
migrants may be affected by remittances, as examined by Djajic ’ (1986).
5. Note that home’s imposition of its optimal immigration restriction implies that fewer
foreigners are allowed to migrate to the home country than is necessary to maximize
world income, as µ>( µ+µ
*)/2.
6. Note that there are in fact many ways of dividing the world population into two groups
such that mean worker qualities are equal internationally. These equilibria are not stable in
the sense that starting from an equilibrium workers that are transfered always face an
incentive to retrace their steps. Also note that in the absence of a specification of transpor-
tation costs it is impossible to establish the order in which individual workers migrate.21
7. The optimal stratification of the work force into two or more nations or groups in the
presence of increasing returns to average labor quality is considered in Huizinga (1994).
Berglas and Pines (1981) instead examine the optimal stratification of a heterogeneous
population by income or tastes in the theory of clubs where agents affect each others’
welfares through congestion rather than through labor productivity externalities.
8. Generally, they also are allowed to vote. Note that whether immigrants have voting rights
only makes a difference if it influences which of the two benefit levels be and bu is
preferred by the median voter. These two benefit levels themselves generally change with
the composition of the population, but preferences between the two by those surrounding
the median voter are invariant to small immigration flows, unless the median voter is
already close to being indifferent before immigration takes place.
9. To be precise, pre-tax income, aµ, is affected by the immigration of prospective employed






10. To be precise, using (9) and applying (10) we see that the tax rate, t, is affected by





(2a µ)µ f (a )
11. As before, migration in this setting can have a positive or a negative impact on world
output. If the transfer system in the home country is chosen so as to maximize output Y,
then equation (5), as before, indicates the effect of migration on world output.
12. See Blank (1988) for evidence on the mobility of welfare recipients in the U.S. in
response to interstate differences in welfare benefits.